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Russian Parties & Law
By KRONID LYUBARSKY
The Second October Revolution of 3-4 October 1993 radically altered Russia's already 
complex political and legal situation. Whereas earlier the possibility--or at least the 
hope--had existed that the establishment of constitutional legality and the creation of 
political parties would result from an evolutionary process, this is no longer possible. 
Since October 4 (or, more precisely, after September 21) the formation of democratic 
institutions has taken a revolutionary path. The superficially legal forms that this process 
occasionally may take should mislead no one.
In discussing the relationship between a multi-party system and constitutionality in 
Russia today, one has to consider separately the problem of the creation of parties and 
the present state of constitutional law in the country. Until recently, in what was then the 
USSR, only a single party existed, i.e., the CPSU, and as a result the very meaning of 
the term "party" was distorted in the consciousness of Soviet citizens.
The one party was perceived essentially as an official state institution, endowed by its 
very nature with governmental powers. The CPSU participated in "elections" as part of a 
"bloc" with just one other group--consisting of "non-party members." It is-noteworthy, 
however, that the communist leadership nonetheless endeavored to preserve 
terminology appropriate to a multi-party state, e.g., "party," "bloc," and "elections."
Creation of Political Parties
It was not until 1990, when Article 6 of the USSR Constitution providing for the 
monopoly of the CPSU was abolished, that the creation of genuine political parties as 
such became feasible in principle. The clearest available definition of a "party" is to be 
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found in the first sentence of Article 21 of the German Grundgesetz: "Parties help to 
form the political will of the people."
Unquestionably, the role of political parties consists solely of their contribution to the 
formation and clear expression of the popular will concerning society's vital issues. 
However, parties as such do not carry out the will of the people on their own--they 
perform this function only by means of their participation in elections and then, following 
an electoral victory, by their creation of appropriate structures for the exercise of power.
Consequently, the primary role of parties may best be defined as the ideological and 
organizational preparation of elections to governmental organs. Such external 
characteristics of parties as the formal membership of their supporters are merely 
secondary considerations.
After the abolition of the monopoly of the CPSU, the first party qualifying under this 
definition that entered the Russian political scene was Democratic Russia. Although it 
called itself a "movement," in fact it was a true political party . Democratic Russia began 
to take shape as an organization during the preparation for elections to the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, and then finally constituted itself during the 1990 elections to the 
Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.
(The so-called Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky will not be discussed 
here. Chronologically, this was the first party to be formally registered as such, but it 
was created at the instigation of the KGB as a counterweight to the growing democratic 
movement, and its membership lists were fictitious, with the result that the original 
registration of this "party" was subsequently canceled.)
Before long, however, a split occurred in the ranks of Democratic Russia A large number 
of small groups--also calling themselves "parties"--left the organization. In addition, a 
number of political figures of a "radical democratic" tendency--such as Yuri Afanas'ev--
resigned from it. A large group of members of Democratic Russia who had originally 
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been elected thanks to this organization subsequently went over to the camp of reform 
opponents, joining forces with the supporters of the communist and profascist 
opposition (e .g., Mikhail Astaf'yev, Il'ya Konstantinov, Viktor Aksyuchits).
Following the emergence of Democratic Russia, other political associations began to 
appear one after another. Some of these specifically called themselves "parties," while 
others refrained from using the term. However, the vast majority of public organizations 
that sprang up from 1990 to 1993 provide in their statutes for possible participation in 
elections for federal legislative organs, thus qualifying as genuine parties.
Among these political associations are several organizations that have became familiar 
names throughout Russia, even though it is impossible to know whether the extent of 
their fame truly corresponds to the real number of their supporters and their actual 
political weight. It is conceivable that the popularity of some parties has been artificially 
inflated by the media. Most of these organizations have never published political 
programs and have never even stated what their positions are on vital political and 
economic issues.
Nonetheless, certain parties really appear to have prospects of becoming genuine 
political forces. Among these, the most frequently mentioned are the politico-economic 
association Civic Union (Grazhdansky soyuz), the Democratic Party (Nikolai Travkin), 
the Republican Party (Vladimir Lysenko, Vyacheslav Shostakovsky), and the Party of 
Economic Freedom (Konstantin Borovoi). None of these parties has yet participated in 
an election and consequently it is impossible to test their political power.
Among the large number of organizations that plan to compete in the election there is a 
collection of quite exotic groups, such as the Russian Space Travel Association. 
91 Organizations Registered
In mid-October, at the beginning of the State Duma electoral campaign, the Ministry of 
Justice stated that a total of 91 organizations had been authorized to participate in the 
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elections following official registration in accordance with the Ministry's regulations. The 
very existence of this plethora of organizations claiming to function as political parties 
shows that Russian society is still extremely fragmented. Such a multitude of parties 
means essentially that few real parties exist. Important social groups which could 
provide the basis for the creation of powerful political parties reflecting their interests 
have not yet arisen in Russia.
Primarily, this is related to the instability of the Russian economic system. The old 
economic structures based on central economic management and massive government 
financing have disintegrated. The groups that are interested in the preservation of the 
old order are extremely unstable.
As the impossibility of restoring the old system becomes more and more evident, some 
political figures associated with these groups evolve unto supporters of extreme 
measures, including the use of force, and join the ranks of the radical right wing. The 
path followed by these politicians eventually converges with the mass of the Russian 
Lumpenproletariat (lyumpeny), discontented by the growth of poverty and 
unemployment during the economic reform period.
At the same time, other political figures who have concluded that the restoration of 
communism is impossible are endeavoring to find an appropriate place in the new 
economic reality, but, since they have no clear concept of how to achieve this, they 
constantly shuttle between one political group and another.
Meanwhile, in exactly the same way, many convinced supporters of social reforms are 
still unable to formulate their interests in political and economic terms, hesitating 
between a "harsh" capitalism of "initial accumulation" and a highly paternalistic "social 
democratic" capitalism; consequently they waver between national political structures 
corresponding to these different models.
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As a result, the so-called "parties" themselves are extremely unstable. The makeup of 
the body of their supporters changes constantly. Like the "parties" themselves, the blocs 
the "parties" establish among themselves are similarly unstable. A major role in the 
creation of such associations is played by their leaders' personal objectives--not by 
programmatic goals.
In general, this last feature is characteristic of contemporary Russian parties: By and 
large they arise around personalities with clearly expressed political ambitions, rather 
than in accordance with the socioeconomic interests of their members.
The conclusion can be drawn that in Russia' s transitional stage today a multi-party 
system as such still has not emerged.
Nonetheless, quite visible progress toward a multi-party system has taken place. In view 
of the forthcoming Duma elections, a number of political blocs (e.g., Russia's Choice 
[Vybor Rossii], New Russia [Novaya Rossiya], Civic Choice [Grazhdansky soyuz]), as 
well as separate parties and movements (Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms 
[Rossiiskoe dvizhenie demokrahcheskikh reform], the Democratic Party of Russia, etc.) 
have already been established. These organizations are ready to participate actively in 
the election campaign. Possibly, during the course of the campaign, they will 
consolidate into something resembling the true political parties found in modern 
democratic states. However, it has to be noted that so far this has not occurred.
The role played by extremist parties, movements and organizations--both of communist 
and nationalist-fascist tendencies--in Russian contemporary political life and society in 
general needs to be discussed in this context.
Until recently these organizations continued to be active components of the Russian 
political spectrum. Yel'tsin's attempt after the August 1991 putsch to ban the communist 
party completely was later partially frustrated by rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
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Moreover, a great number of new organizations of communist orientation arose out of 
the ruins of the former CPSU.
As far as the fascist organizations are concerned, in the past these groups never 
encountered any opposition from the authorities and were able to act with virtually 
complete freedom.
However, this situation changed radically as a result of the failed attempt at an armed 
uprising in October 1993. Both "rightist" and "leftist" extremist organizations actively 
supported the uprising and even took part themselves in the rebellion. This gave the 
presidential administration the required determination to take decisive measures against 
these organizations. The activity of a number of these groups was suspended, and in 
some cases this suspension was later changed to a permanent ban.
As a result, at the present time the Russian Communist Workers' Party, the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation, the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Nina 
Andreyeva's party) and other communist organizations officially have ceased all activity 
throughout the Russian Federation. Similarly, the Nazi and Black Hundred 
organizations-- e.g., the National Salvation Front, Russian National Unity, and the 
Russian National Union (Sobor) have officially ceased to operate.
Some democratically minded persons and organizations whose political views differ 
sharply from those of the extremist groups nevertheless are protesting against the 
banning of the activity of the communists and fascists, citing as a basis for their 
opposition generally recognized norms of civil and political liberties. However, in my 
view these arguments are completely inapplicable to Russia. American society can 
afford to permit such freedoms, whereas Russia's situation is more analogous to that of 
postwar Germany, where Nazi and Neonazi organizations are still prohibited, and the 
propagandizing of Nazi ideology and even Nazi symbols is a punishable offense.
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At the present time, on a world plane there exist two criminal ideologies, i.e., Nazism 
and communism. The criminality of Nazi ideology is implicit in the verdicts passed down 
by the Nuremberg Tribunal and is stated explicitly in current German legislation.
As a consequence of the historical fate suffered by communism, which collapsed under 
its own weight and not following a military defeat, no international court has even been 
called on to pronounce a verdict on the activity of a national communist party. However, 
experience shows that communist parties attaining power have created criminal 
regimes that threatened the welfare, indeed the very survival, of a substantial portion of 
their country's population.
Russia's historical situation is such that both the communist and Nazi parties represent 
a real danger not just to the state's democratic system, but to the continued physical 
existence of its citizens. As a result, the complete and final elimination from national 
political life of organizations that function on the basis of these criminal ideologies 
should be recognized as being not only in accordance with principles of the defense of 
human rights, but also as constituting an absolutely necessary precondition for building 
the bases of democratic statehood in Russia.
The measures adopted with respect to these parties should be anchored in relevant 
provisions of the new Russian Constitution--like the analogous provisions found in 
Article 21, Part 2 of the Federal German Republic's Grundgesetz. This prohibition will in 
no way hinder the process of establishing a genuine multi-party system in Russia. The 
reverse is true: the possibility that any of the extremist political forces mentioned could 
gain power may jeopardize prospects for the emergence of a multi-party system.
On the other hand, the new Statute (Polozhenie) on State Duma elections that has been 
promulgated by presidential decree contains provisions that are far more problematic 
than were the measures applied against extremist parties. Under the statute, any party 
or electoral bloc that wishes to put forward its own party list of electoral candidates 
7
needs to collect no fewer than 100,000 signatures of qualified electors in its support in 
order for the party list to be officially registered.
If this requirement is intended to eliminate very small or fictitious parties, it is simply 
superfluous. (The election statute already establishes a minimum threshold of five 
percent of total votes cast for a party to receive any parliamentary seats.) In general, 
however, this requirement is inherently dangerous. At the present time there is great 
doubt about the country's political future--indeed great danger exists that a repressive 
authoritarian regime may arise again in Russia. Should this occur, the political police of 
such a regime would be in a position to obtain lists of the active supporters of opposition 
parties. The action the police would take is not difficult to guess.
The Constitution
At the moment the former Supreme Soviet was dissolved a draft text of a new 
constitution was already in existence. This text had been drawn up by the Constitutional 
Conference, which combined two earlier drafts, a "presidential" draft and a 
"parliamentary" draft, and the document received final form on July 12, 1993. It now 
appears that this constitution--with a few amendments made later in October--will be 
submitted to a national referendum on December 12, 1993, simultaneously with the 
parliamentary election. The constitution will almost certainly be approved.
Despite such ratification by national referendum, the adoption of a new Russian 
constitution at the present time -- however perfect the text may appear--is not likely to 
overcome the country's constitutional crisis for long.
For instance, the draft constitution produced by the Constitutional Conference and 
approved on July 12 does not deal at all with the question of political parties as 
organizations that represent the people's political will through an electoral system. 
Article 29 of the draft refers only to the "right to freedom of association"--which implicitly 
includes the freedom to form political parties, although this is not stated directly.
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The draft states that any restriction on the freedom of association "may be made only in 
the interests of the protection of the bases of the constitutional system or with other 
aims as provided for under law on the basis of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, as well as on the basis of federal laws and decisions of the courts."
The lack of clarity and the inadequacy of this formulation are already evident. The 
contradictory role played by a number of public associations during the course of the 
October events leads one to conclude that it is indispensable to redraft the above 
wording in the interests of greater specificity. Indeed, in view of the special political role 
of parties, the provisions relating to them should constitute a separate article in the 
constitution.
In addition to a statement on the freedom to form parties, the constitution should also 
contain a reference to the need for the internal organization of parties to correspond to 
democratic principles. Parties that claim to represent the political will of the people 
cannot themselves be undemocratic in terms of their internal operations--as, for 
instance, was the former CPSU.
Further, it needs to be stated that political parties are obliged to furnish public 
accounting of the sources of their funding. At the present time there is virtually no 
regulatory legislation in this area. As a worrying example, one can even cite the most 
democratic and pro-reformist bloc of parties, i.e., Russia's Choice. This bloc consists of 
the Democratic Russia movement, the All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private 
Enterprises headed by Vice Premier Yegor Gaidar, the Radical Democrats faction, as 
well as a large number of other groups. This bloc is rightly considered the "President' s 
Party."
There has been no official declaration regarding the bloc's funding, but the media 
regularly name as one of its donors AKKOR (Association of Peasant Farms and 
Cooperatives), an organization that receives substantial government subsidies. Such 
virtually direct government funding of a party that supports this same government 
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constitutes an absolutely impermissible situation, notwithstanding all the sympathy one 
may have for the political course followed by Russia's Choice.
Finally, after the lessons of October 1993, it is clear that the banning of parties which 
strive to harm the foundations of a free democratic order (whether by virtue of their 
declared goals or by the actions of their supporters) should be anchored in the 
constitution.
As a result of inevitable socioeconomic--and consequently political--transformations, the 
current approach to questions of the federal structure of the Russian state cannot fail to 
undergo change. The ambiguous situation that currently exists cannot continue for 
much longer.
At present, the Russian (rossiiskoe) state structurally combines as it were two different 
principles--one, the principle of confederation of national states/republics as constituent 
parts of Russia, and, two, the principle of a centralized, vertical administration of the 
"Russian" (russkie) regions (oblasti) and other administrative units. This situation is 
unviable. One of the above two principles will inevitably impose itself as the sole basis 
for the structure of the state. In turn, this development will create the need for changes 
in the present draft constitution.
Currently, the draft constitution includes the so-called Federation Treaty as a component 
section of the text. At the same time, the main section of the text of the constitution is so 
constructed that the Federation Treaty is virtually ignored. It is to be expected that in the 
near future either the Federation Treaty will be removed from the text of the constitution, 
or the remainder of the text will be rewritten in order to reflect more clearly the 
provisions of that treaty. At that time it will finally become clear what type of state Russia 
will be, i.e., a unitary state, a federation, or a confederation.
Consequently, at the present time it would scarcely be appropriate to adopt a 
permanent constitution. It would be more rational to adopt a Declaration of Civil Rights 
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and Liberties that would have the full force of a constitutional law, as well as a 
temporary constitutional law on the structure of the state, while at the same time 
enacting a special provision specifying the limited period during which it will remain 
valid. The State Duma would then be required later to adopt a permanent constitution 
by some future date that would be laid down.
One may assume that two years or so from now the situation in Russia will stabilize. At 
the present time, however, given the state of Russian society, the adoption of a 
permanent constitution is totally unfeasible. Russian society was unstable enough even 
before October, but the revolutionary events that took place then finally resulted in its 
total destabilization. To expect Russian society to be able properly to appraise and then 
to adopt the draft constitution to be submitted to its approval is not just naive--it is 
dangerous.
Unfortunately, the decision has already been made, and on December 12 the country 
will be called upon to approve the constitution by popular referendum. In my view, this 
constitutes a grave political mistake, the magnitude of which will become apparent in 
the future. It remains only to hope that when this mistake is corrected--as will inevitably 
occur--the result will not be yet more bloodshed.
[Biographical Note: Born in 1934, the author is an astrophycist. During the 1960s and 
1970s, he participated actively in the Soviet civil rights movement. From 1972 to 1977 
he was a political prisoner. Following imprisonment, he lived abroad as a political 
refugee until his citizenship was restored in 1993. He has served as the editor and 
publisher of the newsletter News from the USSR: Human Rights, the annual List of 
Political Prisoners in the USSR, and The Country and the World (Strana i mir). 
Currently, he is editor-in-chief of the Russian Civil Rights Newsletter, first deputy chief 
editor of the political weekly New Time (Novoe vremya), a member of the Russian 
Federation Constitutional Conference and a member of the Presidential Legislative 
Initiative Commission. Mr. Lyubarsky is a candidate for the State Duma to be elected in 
December.]
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